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This paper uses a Dynamic General Equilibrium model that incorporates a detailed 
fiscal policy structure to examine how changes in the tax mix influence economic 
activity and welfare in the Greek economy. The results suggest that tax reforms that 
reduce the labour and capital income tax rates and increase the consumption tax rate 
lead to higher levels of output, consumption and private investment. If the goal of tax 
policy is to promote economic growth by changing the tax mix, then it should reduce 
the capital income tax rate and increase the consumption tax rate. In contrast, a 
lifetime welfare promoting policy would be to cut the labour income tax rate and 
increase the consumption tax rate.    
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This paper examines how changes in the tax mix (defined as distribution of revenue 
by type of tax) influence economic activity and welfare in the Greek economy. To do 
so, this paper conducts tax policy analysis using a Dynamic General Equilibrium 
model which incorporates a detailed fiscal (tax-spending) policy structure. Following 
Mendoza and Tezar (1998) and Cooley and Hansen (1992), the paper examines tax 
policy experiments in which a permanent reduction in one distortionary tax rate is met 
by a permanent change in another distortionary tax rate so that fiscal policy is inter-
temporally solvent. I explore the effects from re-allocating the tax burden upon the 
dynamic paths and the steady state levels of key macroeconomic variables, as well as 
upon output growth and general equilibrium welfare. 
The tax mix has gained a lot of policy attention among European Countries. 
Recently, there are recommendations to the European Countries to re-allocate their 
tax burden by decreasing the labour income tax rate and increasing the consumption 
tax rate, on the grounds that lower labour income tax rates will boost employment and 
output growth (see European Commission (2008a) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000)). 
On the other hand, the increased capital mobility in the enlarged European Union may 
lead to lower tax rates on capital income (see e.g. European Commission (2008b) and 
Mendoza and Tezar (2002)). In that case, labour income or consumption tax rates 
need to increase to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue.  
Based on calibrated Dynamic General Equilibrium models for the U.S., 
Cassou and Lansing (2004), Mendoza and Tezar (1998) and Cooley and Hansen 
(1992) show that changes in the tax mix can produce sizable effects on the dynamic 
paths and the steady state levels of key macroeconomic variables.
1 Stokey and Rebelo 
(1995) and Lucas (1990) find that the effects on long-run growth of reforming the 
U.S. tax system are likely to be small.
2 From a normative point of view, Mendoza et 
                                                 
1 See Papageorgiou (2009a), Jones (2002), Jonnson and Klein (1996) and Braun (1994) for the general 
equilibrium effects of shocks on labour and capital income tax rates. See Gali et al. (2007), Burnside et 
al. (2004), Ardagna (2001), Ohanian (1997), Ludvigson (1996) for General Equilibrium Models that 
study the effects of changes in governments purchases.  
2 Empirical evidence suggests that distortionary tax rates have a negative impact on employment and 
investment (see e.g. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Mendoza et al. (1996, 1997)). However, the 
effects on long-run growth are found to be mixed.  Mendoza et al. (1996, 1997) argue that tax rates on 
labour and capital income affect mostly transitional rather long run growth. On the other hand, Kneller 
et al. (1999, 2001) show that income taxes have a significant impact on long-run growth. These 




al. (1997), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Lucas (1990) show that the welfare effects 
of reforming the U.S. tax structure may be substantial. 
As regards European economies, it is not until relatively recently that 
Dynamic General Equilibrium models have been applied to the study of the 
macroeconomic effects of changes in the tax mix. Angelopoulos et al. (2008) examine 
the effects of alternative tax structures on long-run growth and welfare for the UK; 
Ohanian et al. (2008) and Prescott (2004) examine the impact of labour income tax 
rates on employment for major OECD countries and Daveri and Maffezzoli (2000) 
examine the effects of altering the tax structure on unemployment for selected 
European countries.
3  
This paper is a further attempt to remedy this omission by employing a 
Dynamic General Equilibrium model for Greece, capable of analyzing the 
implications of changes in the tax mix for the aggregate Greek economy. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the implications of changes in the tax 
policy mix for the Greek economy within a Dynamic General Equilibrium framework. 
The interest in conducting tax policy analysis for Greece stems from the fact that tax 
rates in Greece have been increased since the early 80s and there was a sharp increase 
in the tax burden after the mid 90s reflecting the efforts for lower deficits (see e.g. 
Papageorgiou (2009b), European Commission (2008a, 2008b) and Martinez-Mongay 
(2000)). Also, note that such policy reforms are particularly important in the face of, 
sooner or later, unavoidable policy changes necessitated by chronic imbalances like 
the accumulation of high levels of public debt. 
The model captures several observed features present in actual tax structures 
such as tax rates on labour income, capital income and consumption, as well as the 
taxation of dividends. The government uses tax revenues plus the issue of new 
government bonds to finance three activities: public consumption that provides utility 
to households, public investment that augments public capital and lump-sum transfers 
that augment household income.  
                                                                                                                                            
formulation of the government budget constraint and the inability of the empirical methodology to 
separate between transition and long-run effects of tax policy. 
3 Dynamic general equilibrium models that examine the welfare effects of alternative tax structures for 
European countries were also analyzed by Jonsson and Klein (2003) for Sweden and Heer and Trede 




The approach of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model is 
calibrated on data for the Greek economy over 1960:1-2005:4. Then, departing from 
the benchmark economy, the paper examines tax reforms in which a permanent 
reduction in one of the three distortionary tax rates (capital, labour, consumption) is 
met by a permanent change in another distortionary tax rate so that fiscal policy is 
inter-temporally solvent. That is, the present value of tax revenues equals the present 
value of total government spending plus initial payments on debt.
4 Attention is then 
directed to examining the effects from changes in the tax mix on the dynamic paths 
and the long- run equilibrium of some key macroeconomic variables such as output, 
private consumption, private investment, hours worked and primary deficit-to-GDP. 
The effects on output growth paths arising from transitional dynamics are also 
considered. Moreover, the paper examines the quantitative implications from changes 
in the tax mix for general equilibrium welfare. The latter is defined to be the 
discounted inter-temporal utility. 
The results suggest that there are considerable differences in the observed 
dynamic paths, as well as the steady state levels of key macroeconomic variables 
across the different tax regimes. Tax reforms in which a reduction in the capital 
income tax rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax rate, increase output and 
private investment both in the short and long run (new steady state). For instance, a 
one percentage point decrease in the capital income tax rate compensated by an 
increase in the consumption tax rate increases long-run output, consumption and 
investment by 0.78%, 0.54% and 2% respectively. When the cut in the capital income 
tax rate is met by an increase in the labour income tax rate, the increase in long-run 
output, consumption and investment is lower than the case in which the cut in the 
capital income tax rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax rate. In both 
cases, the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio increases in the short run, while it decreases in 
the long run. 
A permanent reduction in the labour income tax rate that is met by a 
permanent increase in the consumption tax rate increases output, consumption, 
investment and hours worked both in the short and long run. The opposite results are 
                                                 
4 Compared to Mendoza and Tezar (1998) and Cooley and Hansen (1992), this paper focuses on 
changes in tax rates that are within the historical experience of the Greek economy. By contrast, they 




observed when the capital tax rate increases in order to meet the loss in labour tax 
revenue. Cuts in the consumption tax rate that are compensated by increases in labour 
or capital income tax rates have a negative impact on output and private investment 
both in the short and long run. 
Concerning the behavior of output growth during the transition, the results 
suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote growth by replacing one 
distortionary tax rate with another, then it should reduce the tax rate on capital income 
and increase the tax rate on consumption. The effects on growth from changes in the 
tax mix along the transition path are found to be quantitatively small and parallel to 
those obtained in previous studies. For instance, a one percentage point reduction in 
the capital income tax rate that is met by an increase in the consumption tax rate raises 
average annual output growth by about 0.03% over the first five years of transition 
(see e.g. Stokey and Rebelo (1995)).   
The results also suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run 
welfare, then it should decrease the capital income tax rate and increase the 
consumption tax rate. On the other hand, when transition dynamics are taken into 
account, tax reforms that reduce the labour income tax rate and increase the 
consumption tax rate are the most desirable of the tax reforms considered since they 
lead to the highest lifetime welfare gain. For instance, the welfare gain of a one 
percentage point reduction in the labour income tax rate accommodated by an 
increase in the consumption tax rate is about 0.30% of extra consumption in each time 
period. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 3 discusses calibration and the model’s long-run solution. Section 4 contains 
the main results and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The theoretical model 
The model economy consists of a large number of identical households, a large 
number of firms, and a government. Households own physical capital, make 
investment decisions and rent labour and capital services to firms in perfectly 
competitive markets. As owners of the firms, households receive profits in the form of 




private capital, labour and public capital. The government in this economy levies 
taxes on labour and capital income and on consumption. It then uses tax revenues and 
bonds to finance three activities: public consumption that provides utility to 
households, public investment that augments public capital, and lump-sum transfers to 
households. 
2.1. Households  
Let   represent the number of identical households indexed by the superscript  , at 
the beginning of period  . Household population grows according to a deterministic 
law of motion:  
t N h
t
1 ,   1 tn t n NN γ γ + =≥  and   is given   (1)   0 0 N >
Let   denote the representative household’s temporal (per period) 
utility function in period t, where   denotes total consumption services enjoyed by 










t ϑ =+                  (2) 
where 
p h
t C  is private consumption in period t, 
h
t L  is  leisure in period t and 
c
t G  is 
average (per household) public consumption goods and services provided by the 
government in period t.
5
The preferences of the representative household are characterized by the 









E uC L β
∞
= ∑    (3) 
where   denotes expectations conditional on the informational set of the household 
at the beginning of period zero and 
0 E
( )
* 0,1 β ∈  is the discount factor. Notice that 
                                                 
5 Thus,  /
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public consumption goods and services influence private utility through the parameter 
[ ] 1,1 ϑ∈− .
6















− − ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =
−
    (4) 
where   is a preference parameter indicating the relative preference of 
consumption over leisure in the same period and 
( 0,1 γ ∈ )
0 σ ≥  is the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion.  
The household is endowed with one unit of time in each period and divides it 
between work effort 
h
t H  and leisure 
h
t L . Thus, the time constraint that the 
representative household faces in each period is: 
                                                                                                                  (5)  1
hh
tt LH +=
The household saves in the form of physical capital 
h
t I  and in the form of one 
period real government bonds  1
h
t B + . It receives labour income,  , capital 
income  , and interest income from government bonds,  , where   is the 
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t K  and government bonds 
h
t B , respectively.  t Z  is labour augmenting 
technology which evolves according to the deterministic law of motion  1 tz t Z Z γ + = , 
where 1 z γ ≥  and   is given. Two additional sources of income are the firm’s 
profits that are distributed in the form of dividends, 
0 0 Z >
h
t Π , and average (per household) 
lump-sum government transfers, 
tr
t G .
7 The household also pay taxes on consumption 
                                                 
6 If  0 ϑ > , the marginal utility of consumption decreases with an increase in 
c
t G . The opposite is true 
when  0 ϑ < . More specifically, if  0 ϑ > private and public consumption are substitutes (e.g. private 
security and state police). On the other hand, if  0 ϑ <  private and public consumption are complements 
(e.g. low quality public education requires additional time and money for private courses). If  1 ϑ =  
public and private consumption are perfect substitutes. Finally, if  0 ϑ = , government consumption does 
not affect household preferences. See also Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000), Finn (1998) and Christiano 
and Eichenbaum (1992) for similar formulations. 
7 Thus,  /
tr tr






and on income from labour and capital earnings. Thus, the representative household’s 
budget constraint in each period is: 
( )
() () ( ) ()
1 1
                          1 1 1
p ch h h
tt t t
lhk k h h b h
tt t t t t t t t t t
CI B
wZH r K r B G
τ
ττ
+ ++ + =
−+ − + Π + +
t r +
h
                       (6) 
        00 ,
h K B  given 
where   is the proportional tax rate on consumption,   is the 
proportional tax rate on labour income and 
0
c







t τ ≤ <  is the proportional tax rate on 
income from capital earnings and dividends. Note that dividends and capital income 
are taxed at the same rate 
k
t τ .  
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h
t K γ γ                                                     (7) 
where  ( ) 0,1
p δ ∈  is the depreciation rate of private capital stock and  0 ξ ≥  is a 
parameter that captures internal adjustment costs on investment.
8 The above 
specification implies that adjustment costs are absent in the steady state. 
Taking prices { }
0 ,,,
kb h
tt t t t rrw
∞
= Π  and fiscal policy { }
0 ,, , ,
ct r l k c
ttt t t t GGτττ
∞
=  as 
given, the representative household chooses a sequence { } 11
0
,, ,, ,
p hhh hh h
tt t t tt
t





in order to maximize (3)-(4) subject to the constraints (5)-(7), the initial conditions for 
00 ,
hh K B  plus the non-negatively constraints for  1 ,, , ,
p hhhh h
tt t tt CL H KB 1 + + . The first-order 






















                                                                                                   (8a) 
                                                 
8 Lapatinas (2009) finds that adjustment costs are important in determining investment dynamics in 
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*
01 lim 0 p h
t
th
t t C Eu K β + →∞ =                                                                                                 (8d)   
*
01 lim 0 p h
t
th
t t C Eu B β + →∞ =                                                                                                  (8e)   
Equation (8a) is the intratemporal condition for the hours worked and states 
that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption in the same 
period should equal to the after-tax wage adjusted by the consumption tax rate. 
Conditions (8b) and (8c) are the Euler equations for  1
h
t K +  and  1
h
t B + , respectively. They 
have the standard interpretation that if the household chooses consumption optimally, 
it exactly equates the cost (in utility terms) from saving one more unit this period with 
the benefit (in utility terms) of consuming the invested product of the unit saved next 
period. Finally, conditions (8d) and (8e) are the transversality conditions which state 
that optimizing households will not hold any valuable assets at the end of the time 
horizon.  
2.2. Firms  
There is a large number of identical firms indexed by the superscript  . f
9 The 
representative firm produces a homogeneous product, 
f
t Y , by using private capital, 
f
t K , private labour, 
f




representative firm has access to the following production function: 
() ( ) ()
12 aa ff f g
tt t tt YKZ H K =
3 a
                                                
                                                                            (9) 
 
9 For simplicity it is assumed that in each period the number of firms equals the number of households. 
10 Thus,  /
gg
tt KK N = t , where 
g




where  ,   is the output elasticity of private capital, of labour and 
public capital, respectively.
() 0,1 i a ∈ 1, 2,3 i =
11 The production function exhibits constant returns to all 
three inputs, that is,  . This implies that the firm realizes an economic 
profit equal to the difference between the value of output and the payments made to 
the private factors. 
123 1 aaa ++=
The firm chooses 
f
t K  and 
f
t H  in order to maximize period-by period profits 
by taking average public capital, 
g
t K , market prices and policy variables as given. 
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t                                                                           (10)   
subject to 
() ( ) ()
12 3 a aa ff f g
ttt tt YKZ H K ≤ 123 1 aaa ,    + +=
0
                                                  (11)   
,
ff
tt KH≥                                                                                             (12)   


















=                                                                                                              (14)   
and the implied economic profits are  ( ) 12 1
f
t aa Y 0
f
t Π =−− > . Conditions (13) and 
(14) have the standard interpretation that the real rental rate of capital and the real 
wage rate equal the marginal product of capital and labour respectively. Note that 
profits are not taxed at the firm’s level. Thus, profits are taxed only once as dividends 




                                                 
11 This production function captures the notion that the quality of public capital influence private 
productivity. Thus, public capital generates positive externalities to individual firms. See also Lansing 
(1998) for a similar formulation.  





2.3. Government budget constraint  
As already noted, the government levies taxes on consumption and on income from 
labour and capital earnings. Total tax revenues plus the issue of new one-period 
government bonds,  1 t B + , are used to finance total government consumption   that 
provides utility to households, total government investment   that augments public 
capital and provides externalities to firms and total lump-sum government transfers 






t G t B . Thus, the budget 
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The law of motion for aggregate public capital which is enhanced by 
government’s investment is given by: 
() 1 1 ,       0
gg g i g
tt t KK G K δ + =− + > given                                                                 (16)  
 where   is the depreciation rate of public capital stock. The 



















∏      (17) 
which jointly with (15) implies that the present value of tax revenues equals the 
present value of government spending plus payments on initial debt. 
2.4. The solution of the model  
2.4.1. Competitive equilibrium  
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence (of random variables), 
{ } 11
0
,, ,, , , ; , , , , ;,,;,,, , ,
p hhh hh h hf f f g f b k l k cct ri
tt t t tt t ttttt t t t t t t t tt
t




ΠΠ  such 
that:  
i) given the sequence of population and labour augmenting technological process 
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= ΠΠ , and the initials conditions for the state 
variables, the allocation { } 11
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tt t t tttttt
t
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problem of the representative household and the representative firm  
ii) given the sequence { } 11
0
,, ,, , ; , , ,
p hhh hh h f f f g
tt t t tttttt
t




, the sequence 
{ }
0 ,,; , ;,,, , ,
kb h f lkc c t r i
t t t t t t t ttt t t wr r GG G τττ
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= ΠΠ  clears the capital, labour, dividend and the 

































iii) given the sequence { } 11
0
,, ,, , , ; , , , ,
p hhh hh h hf f f g f
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ΠΠ , the 
sequence { }
0 ,,, , ,,
lkc c t r i
t t ttt t t GGG τττ
∞
=  satisfies the government budget constraint.   
2.4.2. Stationary competitive equilibrium  
In the long run, all aggregate variables (except total hours of work,  )  grow at the 
same constant rate 
t H
nz γ γ  (balance growth path), where  n γ  is the growth rate of 
population and  z γ  is the growth rate of the deterministic labour-augmenting 
technology process. All variables are transformed into per-effective units to eliminate 
growth and to make them stationary. Thus, for any economy-wide variable 
() ,, ,, ,, , ,
g ct ri
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. Per capita 







=  since in the long run hours grow only at the population 
growth rate,  n γ . The stationary competitive equilibrium is implicitly determined by 
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where  
( ) 11 *
z
γσ ββ γ



















































It can be easily verified that { } 11 1 ,, , , , ,,
pg b
ttttt t t t yc ihk k rb ++ +  completely characterize the 
competitive equilibrium. Thus, the stationary competitive equilibrium is explicitly 
defined by the above eight non-linear difference equations in 
{ } 11 1 , , , ,,, ,
pg b




tt t t t t t ggg τττ
∞
= . 
2.4.3. Steady-state  
A steady state is defined as a situation where all stationary variables remain constant. 
Thus,  11 tt t x xx x +− == ≡  for all t, where   is the long-run value of the variable  x t x . 
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which is a system of eight equations in eight unknowns { } ,, , , ,,,
pg b yc ihkk r b. 
 
3. Calibration and long-run solution  
3.1. Calibration  
The model is calibrated for the Greek economy. The data source is the OECD 
Economic Outlook, unless otherwise stated. The data set comprises quarterly data at 
constant 1995 prices and covers the period 1960:1-2005:4.
14  
For the series of hours work to be compatible with the model economy, I assume 
that the time endowment is () ( ) 365/ 4 15 hours per day 1369 ×=  hours per quarter. 
The average value of per capita hours of work is found to be  0.20 h = . 
The steady state values of the effective tax rates on capital income, labour 
income and consumption are set equal to their average values over the period 2000-
2005 from annual constructed effective tax rates.
15 I choose this period in order to 
capture recent trend in taxation; see also Mendoza and Tezar (1998). The effective tax 
rate on consumption is   and the effective tax rates on labour income and 




l τ = 0 0.27
k τ =
Following Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000) and Correia et al. (1995), I set the 
curvature parameter in the utility function σ  equal to 2. The preference parameter ϑ  
which measures the degree of substitutability/complementarity between private and 
public consumption is set equal to zero; see also Finn (1998) and Christiano and 
                                                 
14 Data for hours of work in the OECD Economic Outlook is available only on annual frequency over 
the period 1983-2005. Prior to 1983 the series are taken from Christodoulakis et. al (1997). To derive 
quarterly observations annual series are interpolated. The interpolation procedure is described in 
Appendix A. Moreover, quarterly series for private and public capital stocks were generated using a 
perpetual inventory method; see Appendix B for details. 
15 The effective tax rates on labour income, on capital income and consumption were constructed 
following Papageorgiou (2009b), who assumes that the self-employed earn both labour and capital 
income. Broadly speaking, the effective tax rates are constructed from information provided by the 
National Accounts as the ratios between the tax revenues from particular taxes and the corresponding 
tax bases. See also Martinez-Mongay (2000) and Mendoza et al. (1994). Appendix that describes how 




Eichenbaum (1992). This zero value implies that public consumption is a pure 
resource drain on the economy. The value of population growth  n γ  is computed from 
population data and is set equal to 1.0014. The growth rate of technological process 
z γ  is set equal to 1.005 which is the average quarterly growth rate of real per capita 
GDP in the USA (see e.g. Kehoe and Prescott (2002)).   
Following the study of Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000), the values of the two 
physical depreciation rates, 
p δ  and 
g δ  are set equal to 0.007 and 0.0078, respectively 
(implying 2.79% and 3.12% annually). The initial level of technological process  0 Z  is 
set equal to 1 since it is a scale parameter which affects only the scale of the economy; 
see King and Rebelo (1999).   
One issue raised when computing the labour and capital shares in output is 
how to treat the income earned by the self-employed; see also Cooley and Prescott 
(1995). The income of self-employed is a combination of labour and capital income 
and as a result a part of their income should be treated as labour income. In the 
National Accounts there is no distinction between labour and capital income earned 
by the self-employed and all of their income is treated as capital income. In order to 
estimate a proxy for the labour income of the self-employed, I assume that the 
opportunity cost of being a self-employed is the labour income that would have 
earned had they been working as employees. Such an opportunity cost can be 
estimated by the average wage of the employees. Thus, the share of labour in output, 
, is computed from data assuming that the self-employed earn an imputed wage. 2 a
16  






where WS  denotes total compensation of employees SS
17, WSE is the imputed wage of 
the self-employed and NGDP is nominal GDP. Following Fiorito and Padrini (2001), 
I assume that each self-employed person “pays himself” the same annual wage - net 
of social security contributions paid by the employers - as that earned by the average 
employee. In that case, the imputed wage of the self employed is 
                                                 
16 This seems to be a reasonable assumption for Greece since the fraction of self-employment is 49%. 
17   in the national accounts is equal to wages and salaries plus employers’ social security 












, where SSCER are social security contributions paid 
by the employers,   is the number of the employees (dependent employment) and 





Following Baxter and King (1993), the exponent of public capital in the 
production function   is set equal to 0.034, which is the average public investment to 
output ratio in the data. The capital share is then calibrated as 
3 a
12 1 aa = −− and its 
value is 0.3660. 
The value of the adjustment cost parameter ξ  is set equal to 10 following 
Mendoza and Tezar (1998). 
Given the long-run value of private investment to GDP,  , which is set 
equal to its average value derived from data, the time discount factor 
/ iy
β  and the ratio 
of private capital to GDP   are jointly calibrated from the steady state version of 
the Euler equation for private capital (19a) and the law of motion of private capital 
accumulation (19b). Their values are found to be 
/ ky
0.9901 β =  and  , 
respectively. The preference parameter 
/ 15.7364 ky =
γ , which is the weight for consumption 
relative to leisure, is calibrated from the condition with respect to labour (19e) 
consistent with a labour allocation equal to 20% of time. Given the value of β , the 
Euler equation for government bonds (19c) implies a steady state quarterly value for 
the real interest rate on public debt equal to 0.01 (implying 4% annually). The steady 
state version of the law of motion of public capital accumulation (19f) implies a 
steady state quarterly value of public capital to GDP equal to  .   / 2.3995
g ky =
The resulting long-run solution of the model is then derived by substituting the 
parameters into equations (19a)-(19h) and solving for the model’s endogenous 
variables. In this solution, the annual long-run debt-to-GDP ratio is set equal to 0.64, 
which is the average value over the period 1970-2005. This implies a quarterly value 
of 2.5600. In that case, the long-run value of government transfers to GDP is 
endogenously determined from the government budget constraint (19h). Table 1 
                                                 
18 Note that if I do not assume an imputed wage for self-employed (i.e.  0 WSE = ), then the labour 




summarizes the calibrated parameters and Table 2 reports the average values found in 
data and the implied long-run equilibrium solution of the model economy. The results 
suggest that the model’s long-run equilibrium solution is in line with data, which 
implies that the pre-tax reform equilibrium is a reasonable platform for tax reform 
analysis. 
 
Table 1:   Calibration 
Parameter 
or Variable  Description Value  Source 
2 a   Labour elasticity in production  0.60  Data 
3 a   Public capital elasticity in production  0.034  Set equal to    /
i
o gy
1 a   Private capital elasticity in production  0.3660  Calibrated as 1- -   2 a 3 a
n γ   Population growth rate  1.0014  Data 
z γ   Growth rate of labour augmenting technology  1.005  Set 
p δ   Private capital quarterly depreciation rate  0.0070  Set 
g δ   Public capital quarterly depreciation rate  0.0078  Set 
0 Z   Initial level of technological process  1  Set 
ξ   Capital adjustment cost parameter  10  Set 
σ   Curvature parameter in the utility function  2  Set 
γ   Consumption weight in utility function  0.3161  Calibrated from (19e) 
/ ky   Private Capital to output ratio  15.7364  Calibrated from (19a) and 
(19b) 
/
g ky   Public Capital to output ratio  2.3995  Calibrated from (19f)  
β   Time discount factor  0.9901  Calibrated from (19a) and 
(19b) 
ϑ  
Substitutability between private and public 
consumption in utility  0 Set 
0 /
c gy   Government consumption to output ratio  0.1469  Data 
/
i
o gy   Government investment to output ratio  0.0340  Data 
0
l τ   Tax rate on labour income  0.30  Data 
0
k τ   Tax rate on capital income  0.27  Data 
0









Table 2:  Data Averages and Long-Run Solution 
Variable  Description  Data Averages Long-Run Solution 
/ cy   Consumption to output ratio  0.6472  0.6091 
/ iy   Private investment to output ratio  0.21  0.21 
h  Hours at work  0.20  0.2099 
/ ky   Private capital to output ratio  11.9371  15.7364 
/
g ky   Public capital to output ratio  1.7850  2.3995 
b r   Real return to government bonds  0.011  0.010 
/ by   Public debt to output ratio  2.56  2.56 
0 /
tr gy   Government transfers to output ratio  0.1636  0.2196 
/ TR y  Tax Revenue to output ratio  0.2916  0.4098 
Notes: (i) Quarterly data over the period 1960:1-2005:4  (ii) Data average for   is over the period 1998:1-2005:4 
(iii) Quarterly series for private and public capital stocks were generated using a perpetual inventory method; see 
Appendix B for details. 
b r
3.2. Linearization and approximate solution 
Conditions (18a)-(18b) and (18d)-(18g) are linearized around the logarithms of steady 
state. The variables in the log-linearized system are expressed as percentage 
deviations from the respective steady state values,  ˆ ln ln tt x xx ≡ − , where   is the 
steady-state value of 
x
t x . Tax rates,  ,,
lkc
tt t τ ττ, are kept constant over time at its data 
average, while the three categories of government spending instruments,  , 






The linearized conditions constitute a second-order difference equation system 
in 6 unknowns, namely, { } ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ,, , , ,
p
tttttt yc ihkk
g , of the form  ( ) 11 0 ˆˆ 0 tt t Ax Ax + Ε += , where 
ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ , , ,,,
pg
tt t t t t t x ycihkk ′ ⎡⎤
⎦ ≡ ⎣ 1 A
2 +
0
 and  ,  are constant matrices of dimension 6  and 66  
respectively. To transform the system into an equivalent first order one, introduce an 
auxiliary variable   and so increase the dimension of the 
system by adding the extra equation 
0 A 6 × ×
11 2: 2 2 tt t t kk k k k ++ ≡⇒ ≡
1 2 tt kk + − = . Thus, the system reduces to the 
following first-order difference equation system, in 7 unknowns, 
, where  ( 11 0 ˆˆ 0 tt t Ax Ax + Ε+ ) = ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ , , ,,, ,2
pg
tt t t t t t t xy c i h k k k ′ ⎡ ⎤ ≡ ⎣ ⎦ ,  1 2tt kk + ≡  and  ,  are 
constant matrices of dimension 
1 A 0 A
77 ×  and 77 × . The final system is a first-order 




the two state variables are ( ) ˆˆ ,
g
tt kk  and the five control variables are 
. The system is solved using the generalized Schur decomposition 
method proposed by Klein (2000). The general solution of the above system can be 
written as: 
( ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ,, , , 2
p





t dM k =                                                                                                                    (20) 
1 ˆ s s
t kP k + = t                                                                                                                    (21) 
where   is the vector of the control variables,  ˆc
t d ˆs
t k  is the vector of the endogenous 
state variables and  , M P are constant matrices of dimension 5  and 22  
respectively. Given the sequences of 
2 × ×
( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ,, , , 2
p
tttt t yc ihk , condition (18c) is used to 
compute the path for the real return to government bonds and condition (18h) is used 
to compute the path for the public debt given its initial value. I report that when I use 
the calibrated values in Table 1, all eigenvalues are real and there are two eigenvalues 
with absolute value less than one, so the model exhibits saddle path stability. 
Combined with the single long-run solution, this implies a unique solution. 
3.3. Methodological issues and computation of the transition following a tax 
reform 
Following Mendoza and Tezar (1998) and Cooley and Hansen (1992), I examine tax 
policy experiments in which a permanent reduction in one of the three distortionary 
tax rates (capital, labour, consumption) is met by a permanent change in another 
distortionary tax so that the present value of total tax revenues equals the present 
value of total government spending plus initial payments on debt (i.e., fiscal policy is 
inter-temporally solvent). The three types of government spending instruments, 
, remain fixed at its pre-tax reform equilibrium levels,  .   ,,
ct ri
tt t ggg 00 0 ,,
ct ri ggg
Combining the government’s budget constraint (18h) and the No-Ponzi 
condition, the government budget constraint can be written in present value terms as:  
() ( )
() () (
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T
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t ct ri b
nz t
t
dc a y a a y
dg g g rb




⎡⎤ ++ + = ⎣⎦
=+ + +
∑
∑ ) 0 +














+ ∏ , and    0 1 d =
The left-hand side of (22) is the present value of tax revenues; the right-hand 
side is the present value of government spending plus payments on initial debt and   
is the discount factor.  
t d
For fiscal policy to be inter-temporally solvent, equation (22) must be satisfied 
when the government changes the tax mix. More specifically, given a permanent 
reduction in one of the three distortionary tax rates, an initial guess is made for the 
permanent level of another distortionary tax rate that is adjusted so that equation (22) 
is satisfied. After setting the two tax rates equal to their new values, the new steady 
state is characterized by the equilibrium conditions (19a)-(19i). The system is solved 
and the new transition paths of the endogenous variables towards the steady state are 
given by the linear equations (20)-(21). Then, setting as initial conditions the pre-tax 
reform equilibrium values of the state variables, an equilibrium sequence of prices and 
quantities is computed for  2500 T =  periods to ensure that the economy has 
convergence close enough to the new steady state. Given these sequences, equation 
(22) is evaluated to check if fiscal policy is solvent. Depending on the outcome, a new 
guess is made for the particular tax rate that is adjusted and the above procedure is 
repeated until equation (22) is satisfied. Note that along the transition path to the new 
steady state, government debt net of interest payments adjusts to fill any gap between 
government spending and tax revenue in any given period. 
 
4. Transitional dynamics, growth and welfare effects of alternative 
tax structures 
This section first examines the effects of changing the composition of distortionary 
taxes on the dynamic paths and the steady state levels of some key macroeconomic 
variables. Then, it provides a quantitative comparison of the output growth paths 
arising from transition dynamics across the different tax regimes. Finally, it examines 





Following the methodology described in the previous section, I study tax 
policy experiments in which a 1 percentage point reduction in one of the three 
distortionary tax rates (capital, labour, consumption) is met by a permanent increase 
in another distortionary tax rate. Each tax policy experiment i is labeled as  . Table 
3 summarizes the tax policy experiments and the implied tax rates. It has to be noted 
that the changes in the tax rates and the implied tax ratios are within the historical 
(recent) experience for the Greek economy. Moreover, under all tax policy 
experiments, the solution is a saddle path.  
i P
 
Table 3: Tax Rates under each Tax Regime 
Policy    i
l τ  
k τ  
c τ  
Benchmark Economy  0.30 0.27 0.20 
1 P : A 1 percentage point reduction in the capital income tax 
rate compensated by an increase in the labour income tax rate 
0.3050 0.26  0.20 
2 P : A 1 percentage point reduction in the capital income tax 
rate compensated by an increase in the consumption tax rate 
0.30 0.26  0.2030 
3 P : A 1 percentage point reduction in the labour income tax 
rate compensated by an increase in the capital income tax rate 
0.29 0.2916 0.20 
4 P : A 1 percentage point reduction in the labour income tax 
rate compensated by an increase in the consumption tax rate 
0.29 0.27  0.2061 
5 P : A 1 percentage point reduction in the consumption tax 
rate compensated by an increase in the capital income tax rate 
0.30 0.3083 0.19 
6 P : A 1 percentage point reduction in the consumption tax 
rate compensated by an increase in the labour income tax rate 
0.3170 0.27  0.19 
 
4.1. Transitional dynamics and long-run Effects of Alternative Tax Structures  
This subsection looks at the effects of changing the composition of distortionary taxes 
on the dynamic paths and the steady state levels of some key macroeconomic 
variables. 
4.1.1 Tax reforms that reduce the tax rate on capital income 
First, I examine the effects of tax reforms that reduce the capital income tax rate and 
increase: a) the labour income tax rate and b) the consumption tax rate. 
Figure 1 displays the transition paths for some key macroeconomic variables 




refers to the case in which the decrease in the capital income tax rate is met by an 
increase in the labour income tax rate and a dashed line refers to the case in which the 
decrease in the capital income tax rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax 
rate. 
 
Figure 1: Transitional Dynamics of Tax Reforms that Reduce the Capital 
Income Tax Rate  

















































































































































































































Notes: (i) The series plotted are percentage deviations from the pre-tax reform equilibrium, 
except primary deficit-to-GDP ratio which is percentage-point deviations from the pre-tax 
reform equilibrium (ii) A positive change in the primary deficit-to-GDP means that the 
primary balance deteriorates with respect to the pre-tax reform equilibrium 
 
First, consider the case in which the decrease in the capital tax rate is met by 
an increase in the labour tax rate. There are two opposite effects on labour supply. The 
intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects caused by the decrease in the 
after-tax return to labour lead households to decrease labour supply on impact. On the 
other hand, the intertemporal substitution effect produced by the increase in the after-
tax to investment induces households to increase labour supply on impact.
19 As Figure 
1 shows, labour supply remains unchanged on impact period. Consequently, output is 
also unchanged.  
The higher after-tax return to investment induces households to consume less 
and to invest more relative to the pre-tax reform economy on impact. Households 
                                                 
19 There is also a wealth effect caused by the higher labour income tax rate that induces households to 
increase labour supply. On the other hand, there is a wealth effect produced by the lower tax rate on 




want to accumulate more capital in the future and since private capital is 
predetermined in the short run, more future capital formation requires an investment 
boom on impact period. Consequently, private investment increases by about 2%, 
while consumption decreases by 0.71%. Note that real wages and the real interest rate 
remain unchanged on impact period since labour supply and the capital-to-labour ratio 
are unchanged.  
Concerning the effects on public finances, the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio 
increases on impact since the decrease in the consumption to output ratio allows lower 
consumption tax revenues as share of output relative to the pre-tax reform economy. 
Thus, the higher labour tax revenues cannot meet the decrease in capital and 
consumption tax revenues.  
In the following periods of transition, even though work effort decreases along 
the dynamic path, the higher level of the private capital stock leads to higher output.
20 
The real interest rate adjusts downwards so that households decrease investment 
demand to allow their consumption to be smoothed over time. The primary deficit-to-
GDP ratio declines along the transition path since the increase in the consumption to 
output ratio allows for higher consumption tax revenues as share of output. However, 
the deterioration of the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in the early years of transition 
leads to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
In the long run, output, private consumption and private investment (private 
capital) increase by 0.5%, 0.17 and 1.87%, respectively. By contrast, hours of work 
are 0.30% lower. There is an improvement in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in the 
long run, reflecting the servicing of a higher public debt-to-GDP ratio. These results 
are consistent (even though  quantitatively different) with the findings of Cooley and 
Hansen (1992), who show that replacing the capital tax rate with a labour tax rate 
increases output, consumption and capital, while it decreases labour supply.  
Let us now consider the case in which the decrease in the capital tax rate is 
met by an increase in the consumption tax rate. The propagation mechanism and the 
qualitative effects on macroeconomic variables are the same as in the previous case. 
However, the distortions are found to be less costly. The main reason is that the higher 
                                                 
20 Public capital remains unchanged both on impact and along the transition path since government 




consumption tax rate does not lead to a heavier taxation of future consumption 
relative to current consumption, but imposes the same burden. Therefore, the 
intertemporal substitution effect on consumption induces a smoother response of 
consumption over all periods. In addition, the intertemporal substitution effect 
induced by the decrease in the marginal product of labour is now weaker. As a result, 
the negative effect on labour supply comes mainly from the intratemporal substitution 
effect. On the other hand, the wealth and the intertemporal substitution effects caused 
by the increase in the after-tax return to investment tend to increase labour supply.  
As Figure 1 shows, the net effect on labour supply is positive and there is an 
increase in work effort by 0.34%. Therefore, output increases by about 0.21%. Private 
investment increases by about 2.34% relative to the pre-tax reform equilibrium, while 
consumption decreases by 0.48%. Moreover, the real interest rate increases on impact, 
while real wages decrease. The primary deficit-to-GDP ratio increases because 
consumption tax revenues cannot meet the loss in capital tax revenues. This is mainly 
justified by the decrease in the consumption to output ratio, which allows for lower 
consumption tax revenues as share of output relative to the pre-tax reform economy.  
In the following periods of transition, even though work effort decreases, 
output continues to increase since private capital increases. The primary deficit-to-
GDP ratio declines along the transition path since the increase in consumption-to-
output ratio increases consumption tax revenues as share of output. On the other hand, 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio increases along the transition path due to the 
deterioration of the primary deficit in the early years of transition.  
Concerning the long-run effects, output, private consumption and private 
investment (private capital) increase by 0.78%, 0.54% and 2.16%, respectively. By 
contrast, hours of work are 0.006% lower. There is also an improvement in the 
primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in the long run, reflecting the servicing of a higher 
public debt-to-GDP ratio.  
Finally, note that the increase in output, private consumption and capital is 
higher than the case in which the decrease in the capital tax rate is met by an increase 
in the labour tax rate. These results are in line with Cooley and Hansen (1992), as well 




for the macroeconomy than consumption tax rates (see e.g. Daveri and Tabellinni 
(2000)).   
4.1.2 Tax reforms that reduce the tax rate on labour income  
Second, I examine the effects on the dynamic paths and the steady state levels of tax 
reforms that reduce the labour income tax rate and increase: a) the capital income tax 
rate and b) the consumption tax rate.  
Figure 2 displays the transition paths for some key endogenous variables 
expressed as percentage deviations from the pre-tax reform equilibrium. A solid line 
refers to the case in which the decrease in the labour income tax rate is met by an 
increase in the capital income tax rate and a dashed line refers to the case in which the 
decrease in the labour income tax rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax 
rate. 
 
Figure 2: Transitional Dynamics of Tax Reforms that Reduce the Labour 
Income Tax Rate 




















































































































































































































Notes: See Figure 1 
 
In the case in which the decrease in labour income tax rate is met by an 
increase in the capital income tax rate, the intratemporal and intertemporal 
substitution effects caused by the increase in the after-tax return to labour tend to 
increase labour supply. On the other hand, the intertemporal substitution effect caused 




As Figure 2 shows, the net effect on impact period is a decrease in labour supply and 
output by about 0.07% and 0.04%, respectively. The lower after-tax return to 
investment induces households to consume more and to invest less relative to the 
benchmark economy. As a result, consumption increases on impact by about 1.47%, 
while investment decreases by 4.54%. The real interest rate increases in order for the 
markets to clear, while real wages increase due to the lower labour supply. The 
primary deficit-to-GDP ratio decreases because the higher consumption-to-output 
ratio allows higher consumption tax revenues as share of GDP.  
In the subsequent periods of transition, labour supply increases. However, the 
low levels of the future private capital stock lead to lower levels of output relative to 
the benchmark economy. The real interest rate adjusts upwards so as to allow 
households to smooth consumption over time, while real wages decrease relative to 
the pre-tax reform economy.  
In the long run, output, private consumption and private investment (private 
capital) decrease by 1.17%, 0.50% and 4.1% respectively, while labour supply 
increases by 0.59%. The primary deficit-to-GDP ratio deteriorates in the long run, 
reflecting the need for servicing a lower public debt-to-GDP ratio.   
Consider next the case in which the decrease in the labour tax rate is met by an 
increase in the consumption tax rate. Both tax rates affect the same decision margin 
(consumption-labour choice), but in the opposite direction. As Figure 2 shows, labour 
supply, output, private consumption and private investment on impact period increase 
by 0.68%, 0.40%, 0.46% and 0.61%, respectively. The real interest rate increases, 
while real wages decrease.  
In the following periods of transition, the higher labour supply increases the 
marginal product of private capital implying higher future capital formation. 
Therefore, along the transition path, output and private capital (investment) are higher 
relative to the pre-tax reform economy. The primary deficit-to-GDP ratio deteriorates 
slightly in the early years of transition since the higher consumption tax revenue 
cannot meet the loss in labour tax revenue. Consequently, the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio increases in the following years of transition. 
In the long run, output, labour supply, private consumption and private capital 




economy. However, real wages and the real interest rate return to their pre-tax reform 
values since the labour-to-output and capital-to-output ratios remain unchanged. The 
primary deficit-to-GDP ratio improves in the long run, whereas the public debt-to-
GDP is higher due to the deterioration of primary deficits in the early years of 
transition.  
The above results are in line (albeit quantitatively different) with the findings 
of Mendoza and Tezar (1998) for the U.S. economy. For instance, he finds that 
substituting the labour tax rate with a consumption tax rate increases output and 
private capital by about 8% in the long-run.  
4.1.3 Tax reforms that reduce the tax rate on consumption 
Third, I examine the effects on the dynamic paths and the steady state levels of tax 
reforms that reduce the tax rate on consumption and increase a) the capital income tax 
rate and b) the labour income tax rate.  
Figure 3 displays the transition paths for some key macroeconomic variables 
expressed as percentage deviations from the benchmark economy. A solid line refers 
to the case of reducing the consumption tax rate and increasing the capital income tax 
rate and a dashed line refers to the case of reducing the consumption tax rate and 
increasing the labour income tax rate. 
 
Figure 3: Transitional Dynamics of Tax Reforms that Reduce the Consumption 
Tax Rate 






















































































































































































































As Figure 3 shows, when the reduction in the consumption tax rate is met by 
an increase in the capital income tax rate, households find it optimal to consume more 
and work less relative to the pre-tax reform equilibrium. Consumption is 1.75% 
higher on impact, while labour supply decreases by about 1.37%. As a result, output 
decreases by 0.83%. Private investment also decreases by 9.32%, while there is an 
improvement in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio since tax revenues from 
consumption increase significantly.  
Even though work effort increases in the subsequent periods, the lower private 
capital stock leads to a decrease in output along the dynamic path. Real wages 
decrease in the subsequent periods of transition due to the decrease in the output-to-
labour ratio, while the real interest rate adjusts upwards allowing households to 
smooth consumption over time. As a result, consumption decreases relative to the pre-
tax equilibrium in the following periods of transition. 
In the long run, output, consumption, hours worked and private capital (private 
investment) are 3.1%, 2.24%, 0.02% and 8.16% respectively lower relative to the 
benchmark economy. The primary deficit-to-GDP ratio deteriorates in the long run 
reflecting the servicing of the lower public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
   Consider next the case in which the decrease in the consumption tax rate is 
compensated by an increase in the labour income tax rate. As already explained, both 
tax rates affect the same marginal decision, but in the opposite direction. Figure 3 
shows that the distortions from the higher tax rate on labour are more costly than the 
benefits from the lower consumption tax rate. Therefore, output, consumption, hours 
worked and private investment decrease on impact and along the transition path.  
In the long run, output, private consumption, hours worked and private capital 
(private investment) are 0.98%, 1.28%, 1.04% and 0.98% lower relative to the pre-tax 
reform economy. Note that real wages and the real interest rate return to its pre-tax 
reform equilibrium values since the labour to output and capital to output ratios 
remain unchanged. Finally, there is deterioration in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio, 
which reflects the servicing of a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.    
4.2. Growth rate paths arising from transitional dynamics  
This subsection provides a quantitative comparison of the output growth paths arising 




the different tax regimes. Since long-run growth is exogenous, shifts in the growth 
rates are only temporary.  
Figure 4 shows the annual output growth rate paths arising from transitional 
dynamics.
21 A quantitative summary of the transition paths is presented in Table 4.  
The first line of Table 4 and subplot (1,1) of Figure 4, where (1,1) refers to raw 
and column numbers respectively, show that reducing the capital tax rate and 
increasing the labour tax rate yields an output growth gain both on impact and along 
the dynamic path. Output growth is between 0.028% and 0.016% over the first ten 
years following the change in the tax mix. When the consumption tax rate increases to 
meet the loss in capital tax revenue, output growth also increases both on impact and 
along the dynamic path. As subplot (1,2) shows, its value is between 0.03% and 
0.02% during the first decade.  
 
Figure 4: Output Growth Rates ( ( ) 1 ln / 100 tt yy + × ) Arising from Transitional 
Dynamics 




























































































































































                        Note: Impact Period is not shown in the subplots 
Decreasing the labour income tax rate and increasing the capital income tax rate, 
produces an output growth slowdown on impact period by about 0.07%. In the later 
periods of transition, output growth is between -0.06% and -0.04% for about a decade. 
When substituting the decreased labour tax rate with a higher consumption tax rate, 
                                                 
21 Quarterly observations generated by the model have been transformed into annual observations 
following Christiano (1989). In particular, a four period sum is taken of data and every fourth resulting 




growth on impact period is about 0.41%. However, in the subsequent periods of 
transition the effects on growth are trivial. As already explained, this is justified by 
the fact that both tax rates affect the same margin (consumption-leisure choice) and 
the responses are found to be very smooth.  
Decreasing the consumption tax rate and increasing the capital income tax rate 
produ
Table 4: Output Growth Rates (
ces a growth slowdown both on impact and along the transition path. After the 
impact period, output growth rates are between -0.13% and -0.08% for about a 
decade. Finally, when the decrease in the consumption tax rate is met by an increase 
in the labour income tax rate, there is a growth slowdown on impact period by about -
0.73%. In the subsequent periods, the effects on growth are found to be small and 
about 0.01% during the first decade. 
 
( ) 1 ln / 100 tt yy + × ) Arising from Transitional 
Dynamics 
Growth 
Rate (%)  nual Growth Rates (%) over the  Average An
first four 
Five-Year tervals





  1     4 
i 
2        3                    
1 P () ,
kl ττ ↓↑   0.01% 0.0   0.01     25% 8% 0.0138%  0.011%
2 P ( ) ,
kc ττ ↓↑   0.22% 0.029% 0.023%  0.016%  0.012% 
3 P () ,
lk ττ ↓↑   -0.07% -0.06%  -0.04%  -0.032%  -0.023% 
4 P () ,
lc ττ ↓↑   0.41% 0.008% 0.006%  0.004%  0.003% 
5 P ( ) ,
ck ττ ↓↑   - 0.87%  -0.114%  -0.09%  -0.065%  -0.048% 
6 P () ,
cl ττ ↓↑   - 0.73%  -0.013%  -0.01%  -0.008%  -0.006% 
          Impact period is not taken into
It is interesting to note that transitions dynamics are found to be quite lengthy 
for mo
 *  account.   
 
st of the tax experiments considered since it takes more than 50 years for the 
economy to reach its pre-tax reform balance growth path. Thus, growth rates are 
affected by transitional dynamics for a long period of time. However, as Figure 4 and 




The above results are in line with the empirical findings of Mendoza et al. 
(1996,1997), who argue that tax rates affect transition growth. Moreover, it should be 
noted that the quantitative implications that are obtained for the growth rates along the 
transition path parallel those obtained in endogenous growth models in which tax 
policy changes have permanent effects on long-run growth. For instance, Stokey and 
Rebelo (1995) in various endogenous growth models find that eliminating all income 
taxes produce long-run growth effects between 0 and 3.3 percentage points.  
To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to promote growth by replacing one 
distortionary tax rate with another, then it should reduce the capital income tax rate, 
while simultaneously increase either the consumption or the labour income tax rate.  
4.3. Welfare effects of alternative tax structures 
This subsection provides a quantitative comparison of the welfare gains or losses 
associated with the alternative tax mixes.  
Following among others Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Lucas (1990), I 
compute the permanent percentage change in private consumption that leaves 
households indifferent between lifetime utility obtained by remaining in the pre-tax 
reform equilibrium and the lifetime utility obtained by undertaking the tax reform. 
This percentage change is defined as  . This number measures the increase/decrease 
in consumption required to provide households with the same lifetime utility level as 
in an economy with a different tax structure. If   there is a welfare gain of 
moving from the benchmark tax structure to the tax structure under regime   and vice 
versa for  . First, I compute the steady state welfare gains/losses by comparing 
the lifetime welfare between pre-tax reform and post-tax reform steady states. Then, I 
compute the lifetime welfare by taking into account the transition from the steady 
state of the pre-tax reform economy to the new steady state (Appendix C describes 
how the steady state and lifetime welfare gains or losses are computed). Table 5 
shows the value of   implied by each tax regime, while Figure 5 plots the utility 
levels for the first 400 quarters expressed as percentage deviations from the utility 
















Welfare Gain / Loss
x 
Lifetime Welfare 
Gain / Loss 
1 P () ,
kl ττ ↓↑   0.3461% 0.0749% 
2 P ( ) ,
kc ττ ↓↑   0.5416% 0.2289% 
3 P () ,
lk ττ ↓↑   -0.8480% -0.2430% 
4 P () ,
lc ττ ↓↑   0.3842% 0.3027% 
5 P ( ) ,
ck ττ ↓↑   -2.2550% -1.0295% 
6 P () ,
cl ττ ↓↑   -0.6887% -0.5447% 
 
 
Figure 5: Utility 

















































































































































Consider first the steady state welfare consequences of the alternative tax 
policies. Table 5 illustrates that reducing the capital income tax rate and increasing the 
labour income tax rate produces a steady state welfare gain equal to 0.3461%. This 
number measures the permanent percentage increase in consumption required to 
provide households with the same utility as in an economy with a lower tax rate on 
capital and a higher tax rate on labour. Decreasing the capital income tax rate and 





Reducing the labour income tax rate and increasing the capital income tax rate 
produces a steady state welfare loss equal to 0.8480%. On the contrary, if the decrease 
in the labour income tax rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax rate, there 
is a steady state welfare gain equal to 0.3842%. Cuts in the consumption tax rate that 
are accommodated by increases in capital or labour income tax rates lead to a welfare 
loss equal to 2.255% and 0.6887%, respectively.  
Consider next the effects on lifetime welfare by taking into account the 
transition from the steady state of the pre-tax reform economy to the new steady state. 
Table 5 illustrates that reducing the capital income tax rate and increasing the labour 
income tax rate produces a lifetime welfare gain equal to 0.0749%, which is about 
78% lower than the steady state welfare gain. This is because consumption falls 
sharply during the early years of transition implying a large cost of transitional 
dynamics and a lower utility level (see also subplot (1,1) of Figure 5). Decreasing the 
capital income tax rate and increasing the consumption tax rate leads to a lifetime 
welfare gain equal to 0.2289%, which is also lower than the steady state welfare gain. 
As subplot (1,2) shows, the low levels of consumption and leisure lead to a lower 
utility level in the early years of transition. 
Reducing the labour income tax rate and increasing the capital income tax rate 
leads to a lifetime welfare loss equal to 0.2430%. This value is considerably lower 
than the steady state welfare loss since there are transitional gains from the increase in 
consumption in the early years of transition that increase utility (see subplot (1,3)). 
The case in which the decrease in the labour income tax rate is met by an increase in 
the consumption tax rate produces a lifetime welfare gain equal to 0.3027%, which is 
close to the steady state welfare gain. The result that the lifetime welfare gain is 
higher than the case in which a decrease in the capital income tax rate is met by an 
increase in the consumption tax rate, is consistent with the findings of Ardagna (2001) 
and Mendoza and Tezar (1998). They show that when transitional dynamics are taken 
into account, the labour tax rate is more distortionary than the capital tax rate.  
Consider next the case in which there is a cut in the consumption tax rate that 
is met by an increase in the capital income tax rate. Table 5 shows that there is a 
lifetime welfare loss equal to 1.0295%. This value is about 50% lower than the steady 
state welfare loss since there is an increase in utility in the early years of transition 




in the consumption tax rate accommodated by an increase in the labour income tax 
rate leads to a lifetime welfare loss equal to 0.5447%.  
It is important to note that these results are consistent with previous findings in 
the literature. For example, Mendoza and Tezar (1998) find that replacing the capital 
income tax rate with a consumption tax rate leads to a long run welfare gain equal to 
9.8%, while replacing the labour income tax with a consumption tax rate leads to a 
steady state welfare gain equal to 4.8%. However, when the costs of transition are 
taken into account, the welfare gains are about 78% and 35% respectively lower. 
These numbers are in line with the results reported in Table 5. Finally, Cooley and 
Hansen (1992) for the U.S. economy find that eliminating the capital tax rate and 
increasing the labour tax rate and the consumption tax rate leads a welfare gain equal 
to 5.6% and 6.7%, respectively. However, when transitional dynamics are taken into 
accounts the welfare gains are about 60% lower.  
To sum up, if the goal of tax policy is to promote long run welfare, then it 
should decrease the capital income tax rate and increase the consumption tax rate. On 
the other hand, when transition dynamics are taken into account, tax reforms that 
reduce the labour income tax rate and increase the consumption tax rate are the most 
desirable of the tax reforms considered since they lead to the highest lifetime welfare 
gain. 
4.3.1. Sensitivity analysis  
This section provides a sensitivity analysis and examines how steady state welfare is 
affected when different combinations of tax rates on labour income, capital income 
and consumption are used to raise the same amount of total tax revenues; see also 
Cooley and Hansen (1992). More specifically, I compare the steady state welfare 
gains/losses for different combination of tax ratios ( ) /
kl τ τ ,  ( ) /
kc τ τ ,  ( /
lc ) τ τ  that 
give raise to the same total steady state tax revenues, which are equal to the steady 








      Figure 6: Steady State Welfare Comparisons 





















































































































































































































































Figure 6 shows the steady state welfare gains/losses for these tax experiments, 
as well as the steady state output, consumption and hours worked expressed as 
percentage deviations relative to their pre-tax reform values. Subplot (1,1) of Figure 6 
shows that as the ratio () /
kl τ τ  decreases (i.e. the tax rate on capital income 
decreases and the tax rate on labour income increases) from its pre-tax reform value, 
steady state welfare gain increases. Long-run output and consumption increase 
relative to their pre-tax reform values, while labour supply decreases (see subplots 
(1,2), (1,3) and (1,4) respectively). The same comments apply to the case in which the 
ratio  ( /
kc ) τ τ  decreases from its pre-tax reform value (see subplots (2,1)-(2,4)). 
However, note that the steady state welfare gains, as well as the increase in long-run 
output, consumption and hours worked are higher than in the previous case. Finally, 
subplot (3,1) shows that as the ratio ( ) /
lc τ τ  decreases from its pre-tax reform value, 
there is a steady state welfare gain, while long-run output, consumption and hours 
increase relative to their pre-tax reform values. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has examined how changes in the tax mix (defined as distribution of 





The results suggest that tax reforms in which a reduction in the capital income 
tax rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax rate, increase output and private 
investment both in the short and long run. When the cut in the capital income tax rate 
is met by an increase in the labour income tax rate, the increase in long-run output and 
private investment is lower than the case in which the cut in the capital income tax 
rate is met by an increase in the consumption tax rate. In both cases, the primary 
deficit-to-GDP ratio increases in the short run, while it decreases in the long run. 
A permanent reduction in the labour income tax rate that is met by a 
permanent increase in the consumption tax rate increases output, private consumption, 
private investment and hours worked both in the short and long run. The opposite 
results are observed when the capital tax rate increases in order to meet the loss in 
labour tax revenue. Cuts in the consumption tax rate that are compensated with 
increases in labour or capital income tax rates have a negative impact on output and 
private investment both in the short and long-run. 
In addition, the results suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote 
growth by replacing one distortionary tax rate with another, then it should reduce the 
tax rate on capital income and increase the tax rate on consumption. On the other 
hand, if the goal of tax policy is to promote lifetime welfare, then it should decrease 
the labour income tax rate and increase the consumption tax rate.  
For future work it would be interesting to introduce heterogeneous agents and 














A. Interpolation of Hours Worked 
To derive quarterly series for hours of work from the corresponding annual series, the 
interpolation procedure uses information in total employment since total employment 
series is available at quarterly frequency. More specifically, the interpolation rule is 












   (A.1) 
where  , , and   are hours worked in year i and quarter  1960 2005 i =− 1,...4 j = , ij h j  
respectively. 
B. Construction of capital stock series 
The private capital stock is generated using a perpetual inventory method. Given an 
initial capital stock in 1960, real total fixed investment  t I  is accumulated using the 
law of motion of capital  () 1 1
p
tt t K KI δ + =− +. The depreciation rate 
p δ  is set equal 
to 0.007. Following Conesa et al. (2007), the initial value for the private capital stock 
is chosen such that the capital-to-output ratio in 1960 matched the average capital-to-
output ratio over the period 1961:2-1965:4. Using data for real government 
investment, the same method used for the construction of public capital stock series. 
The value of the depreciation rate 
g δ  is set equal to 0.0078. 
C. Welfare comparisons 
a) Lifetime welfare comparisons 
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 where   and   are constant along the balanced growth path and 
, Z . The lifetime welfare following a policy change is: 
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where   and 
* V V  are given by (C3) and (C2) respectively. In the simulations, the time 
horizon for the calculation of   is 
* V 2500 T =  periods/quarters. 
b) Steady state welfare comparisons 
For steady state comparisons, note that the steady state utility in the post-tax reform 
equilibrium is:  
() ( ) () ( )
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where   and   are constant along the balanced growth path. We then find the value 
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